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The Middle East and European Security in the Fifties: a Historical 
Assessment.
European security concerns go well beyond the European theatre. As 
it has clearly come out during these last months, international 
relations have experienced such an evolution that the so called 
'out-of-area' threats not only seem most plausible, but also most 
difficult to tackle.
Of all of them, the Eastern Mediterranean-Middle East (generally 
speaking the area which goes from Greece in the west to Pakistan in 
the east and from Turkey in the north to Egypt in the south) has 
always had a long tradition of being a risky issue.
This phenomenon has two kinds of roots: l.the long term tradition 
of European intervention and permanent militarized presence in the 
area -which has created long-rooted and large economic-strategic 
interests; 2. the difficulties experienced by the Middle Eastern 
states themselves after II World War to come to terms with the 
problem of political stability. This last situation has been partly 
linked to the question of the phasing out of colonial ties and the 
rising of anti-western nationalism and partly to the negative 
synergy emerging from the connection of these questions with 
structural long term problems of the area such as underdevelopment, 




























































































This paper is primarly concerned with the first set of problems 
(those pertaining to western intervention, with special reference 
to the British and American cases) and with their development in 
the aftermath of II World War up to the mid Fifities. It is built 
around the main question : is it possible to explain, historical­
ly, why military action has become the only plausible way to come 
to terms with security problems in the Middle East? To do this I 
principally assumed that the late forties and fifities were a period 
when exceptionally great chances and opportunities were offered 
while, in a parallel way, exceptionally important changes in the 
international arena were influencing the Middle East. My conclusions 
are that this was a time when opportunities were missed and that 
British and American patterns of action in that period set the 
quality of the militarization of western diplomacy as we know it 
today.
The post-war origins of British-American collaboration over the 
Middle East-Eastern Mediterranean.
There were three main western strategic interests at stake after 
the II World War in the Middle East:
1. petroleum, the key to the wealth of western industrial nations 
rapidly converting from coal to cheaper oil after the war -while 





























































































2. the possibility of counter-attacking the Soviet highly 
industrialized Caucasian areas from the bomber bases of Suez (and, 
later, Marocco and Lybia) in case Russia forced the withdrawal of 
all western forces from continental Europe and from Great Britain - 
which was the hypothesis that was most likely for D+6months period 
under Anglo- American emergency war plan before the foundation of 
NATO (2) and which remained highly plausible after the new military 
alliance was in formation.
3. the maintenance of the lines of communication (LOC) through the 
Mediterranean in order to get a.the oil coming from the pipelines 
ending on the Levant shores or through the Suez Canal b.the supply 
and reinforcement coming from the Far East (a 50% time saving was 
obtained going through the Suez Canal instead of the longer Good 
Hope Cape Route).
The importance of these interests was differently rated in the 
United Kigdom and in the United State. For the British, the Middle 
East was the primary area of security concern after the war. It 
represented one of the main pillars of the British security system 
- after the defence of the national territory and the control of the 
main Lines of Communication leading to Great Britain (3). Confronted 
with a crucial economic crises in Winter 1946-47 and with the cut 
asked by the Treasury on expenses for the huge service personnel 
deployed overseas, the Government decided to take action (4). Prime 
Minister Attlee's previous call for a total withdrawal had been 
already dismissed by Spring 1946 (5) and a more incremental 




























































































June 1948 and later anticipated to August 1947), the handing over to 
the United Nations of the mandate on Palestine and the reduction in 
overseas committments (in the Middle East and, to a lesser extent, 
in the Balkans) (6) .
The hasty and sudden British retreat from Greece and Turkey was, 
thus, one of the measures taken by an overcommitted government, not 
the most important one. This action and the following American 
behaviour caused mutual resentment both in the American Department 
of State (which considered it "a far too casual" retreat) and among 
British leadership (Eden reproched the Americans of being ever 
watchful for opportunities to turn British problems into American 
advantages (7) . This situation thus set the path for analogous 
reproaches all along the fifties.
The so called Pentagon Talks over Eastern Mediterranean and Middle 
East (October 16 to November 7, 1947) were originated by Bevin's 
response to strong American reproaches over the British "eagerness 
to pass the buck" in other's hands (8) -which eventually led the 
Americans to assume responsabilities in the violent and chaotic 
Greek civil war in support of an antidemocratic government (and to 
build the Truman Doctrine around the military support for Greece 
and Turkey ).
American's willingness to confine the talks to the military aspects 
of the question was opposed by Bevin. Bevin had been stressing 
since 1946 that the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean question 
be placed in the political context of anti-Soviet containment. As 




























































































about Mediterranean in a memorandum written for the Cabinet in March 
1946 "If we move out Russia will move in" (9).
The talks ended by a general understanding about the Middle East's 
being "vital" for both the United States and Great Britain. It was 
decided to use political, economic and "if necessary, military 
power" to help Italy, Greece, Turkey and Iran to maintain their 
"territorial integrity and political independence", "to make evident 
in firm but non provocative manner" American determination in 
preserving the security of the area (10).
Pentagon Talks ended by a misunderstanding on American willingness 
to take responsabilities over the Middle East. The United States 
were eager to make political use of military forces as they had 
done in Iran and Turkey (1946) -where, according to one eminent 
scholar, the path for American-Soviet antagonism in Europe was 
first set in (11); but they had no intention to become entangled in 
a definite military garantee for the area. "Whereas we propose to 
take a political stand against Soviet aggresion on Italy-Greece- 
Turkey-Iran front" was written in a memoranudm of november 1947 
cleared with some of the most knowledgeable officials of the 
Department of State "it is not improbable that in the event of the 
necessity of recourse to arms, our military effort might be 
concentrated elsewhere with a view to most effective use of forces 
employed" (12).
The ratio of the disagreement hiding under the Unitarian cover of 




























































































For the British, this expression had been historically a sort of 
"last refuge of imperialism" -as it was called by a historian who 
can't be suspected of marxist simpathies, Gallagher (13). In 
practical terms, after the war, a large part of civilian and 
military officers seemed to share the opinion that the privileged 
position enjoyed by Great Britain in the international arena was 
directly linked to the holding of the Middle East "and all that this 
involves". The eventual surrender of responsability in that area was 
seen as deeply linked to the general withdrawl of Great Britain 
from the role of great power (u ). Suez basis had, in this context, 
a highly symbolic value because its return in Egyptian hands was 
seen -and it would have continued to be so- as "a serious blow to 
British prestige throughout the Middle East" (15).
There was, thus, an intimate contradiction between the willingness 
to share power with the United States and the necessity to maintain 
the status of priviledged ally with respect to the Middle Eastern 
countries.
The United States, on the contrary, used the "power vacuum" notion 
mainly in an anti-communist sense. During conversations held in 
November 1949 between Michael Wright, British Assistant Under­
secretary in charge of Middle Eastern Affairs and George McGhee, 
American Director of the Division of Near Eastern, South Asian and 
African Affairs in the State Department the difference in 
perspective was clarified. The two agreed over the usual perception 
of the Middle East as being "a vital cold war objective" (16); but 




























































































nationalism against communism", the British retorted that
"(...)support of nationalism could be used effectively against the 
spread of communism. But nationalism and communism could not be 
fought toghether" (17). And, as it was clear in the case of Egypt, 
the fight against nationalism had the first priority for the British 
while, historically, it could not hold the priority for American 
policy, traditionally rooted from the times of Wilson in the 
support of nationalisms. The American collusion with Great Britain 
entailed a main risk. As Nitze would have convincingly put it some 
years later (April 1952): "What we were proposing to do was to use 
our prestige but not our strenght to keep the British position. The 
British, however, have little phisical and less moral strenght in 
the area: conseguently in embarking on this course we ran the danger 
of becoming involved in their general decline in the Middle East 
without being able effectively to halt it" (18).
In spite of the agreement over the opportunity to "read" the Middle 
East security question in terms of a cold war, the US and UK 
diverged on the means of doing so.
Setting the path for coordinated intervention
Since the end of the war, geographical priority in Soviet 




























































































embracing the Balkans as well. It represented the economic priority 
for the US and it was to Europe that most of the American financial 
and material aid had been devoted.
On the contrary, economic intervention was first provided to the 
Middle East only at the turn of the decade, under the provision of 
the so called "point four" -announced in Truman's inaugural address 
of January 1949 and formalized in the Title IV of Mutual Defense 
Assistance Program of 1950 (19). Even though, American aid was not 
oriented toward the granting of capital for the sponsorship of 
economic development (for obvious both tecnical and political 
reasons); funds were mainly devoted to rapsodic technical assistance 
in the devising of development projects such as disease control 
projects, geological survey and agricultural exploitation.
At the same time, development in international relations in the late 
fourties pointed a way for American intervention that was more 
linked to military rather than an economic set of actions. With the 
signature of the Brussels Treaty and, more definitly, Atlantic 
Alliance, western security began to be considered first of all in 
terms of military standards -a set which was intensified after the 
explosion of the Soviet A bomb. However, during the 1948 Pentagon 
Talks over the creation of a western defensive system (lately the 
Atlantic Pact), the British request for setting up a parallel 
regional security alliance focused on the Middle East and Eastern 




























































































The tendency (and the convenience at the same time) to structure the 
international relations in blocks, to fill the reference to 
'perimeters' of influence with formal alliances, became steadier 
after the Korean war.
If political containment could not work because of the differences 
in British and American views about how to enforce it (and the role 
of arab nationalism in this process) and economic containment would 
have needed larger resources to be set in motion, the international 
mood seemed to point to militarization as the best way to enforce 
containment everywhere.
Generally speaking, the primary aim of the most important military 
alliance in the post war period (NATO) was to fight the supposed 
aggressive nature of the Soviet system (both in terms of internal 
subversion and external aggression) with the setting up of an 
efficient military machine. The concept of Soviet threat had, in 
this context, the maximum symbolic value and the methods of 
analogies (broadly used during Prague coup, Berlin crisis and Korean 
war) dominated political anlysis.
Not only this was the tactic which had offered Great Britain the 
opportunity of entangling the US to the defense of Europe, but this 
seemed to the new conservative Government (which came to power at 
the end of 1951 with Churchill as Prime Minister and Eden as Foreign 
Minister) to be the best way to reestablish the good old special 




























































































But there were two main structural reasons which prevented 
consideration of the Middle East in terms of a single security area:
1. the lack of a unifying menace. Middle East was a "constant 
temptation" for the Soviet Union because expansion towards the south 
would without any doubt offer valuable prices as "protection of 
Caucasian oilfields, control of the Straits, control of Persian oil 
and access to the Persian Gulf", but it clearly represented the most 
open flank of USSR (21). Potentialities of expansion through means 
different from those of overt aggression did not lack (depressed 
economic and social conditions, arab anti-western nationalism, 
dissident groups as the Kurds and Armenians) but it would have been 
difficult to exploit them through the patterns applied in Eastern 
Europe. Communism was at odds with the Arabic culture; moreover, the 
communist party was outlawed in Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, non 
existant in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, unorganized in Jordan (22) .
The American National Security Council thus stated in 1951 that 
there was little danger that the USSR would take an aggressive 
military action unless a global war broke out. Even in this case, 
the Soviet offensive was not expected to develop to maximum 
intensity, even in the more pessimistic British view, before D+6 
months (23).
Israeli menace, on the other hand, had a unifying function inside 
the Arab League, but could not possibly be considered as a workable 




























































































2. taking into account the strong fragmentation and divergent local 
interests of the countries involved, what was negatively resented 
was the lack of a strong federator in the terms of a hegemonic 
power inside or outside the area whose hegemony was legitimized and 
whose military global posture could function as a global guarantee 
for the whole region (24). The Arab League experiment failed both for 
the lack of legitimacy of the outside supporter (Great Britain) and 
over the points of disunity among the Arab world ( ) . Moreover, the
Middle East hosted some of the more divisive issue in Anglo- 
American relationship such as the oil question (26), Suez basis and 
the Israeli problem -an exception to this general tendency being 
the case of arab-israeli dispute, were the US and GB found a common 
ground to begin conversations with both Egypt and Israel, but, as we 
will next see, they failed altogether.
That is why the United States were never enthousiastic about the 
schemes of a collective defense command envisaged by the British in 
the beginning of the fifties to solve in a multilateral framework 
the problem of the Egyptian denunciation of Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 
1938 (Middle East Command till 1952, afterwards called Middle East 
Defence organisation). On the other hand, bilateral Anglo-American 
collaboration came to be progressively focused on the problem of 
military collaboration. As a matter of fact, the best way to 
defend British permanence in the Suez basis appeared to be the 
stressing of its military importance in the framework of a 




























































































pattern of a collective defense organization with an outside 
guarantor was unfeasible, the military realm came to the fore as 
the only minimum common denominator for a coordinated Anglo-American 
action.
Strategic and political difficulties in Anglo-American military 
collaboration over Middle East-Eastern Mediterranean issues.
Broadly speaking, three were the potential ways of penetration from 
the Russian mainland to the Eastern-Mediterranean and Middle East 
region: the first, beginning from the north, implied striking on 
the left wing side of the continental block -through Yugoslavia and 
Italy- and was ultimately aimed to the opening of a southern front 
against France and, eventually, to the control of the core of the 
Lines of Communication in the Central Mediterranean through the 
occupation of Sicily and Sardinia. The second implied an attack on 
the 'soft underbelly' of the Balkans -the Greek Thrace on the border 
between Greece and Turkey (the Dardanelles)- where the small depth 
of the front would have put in serious trouble any possible 
resistance; in this case, the Soviets would have tried to get to the 
Turkish Straits and open the way for their fleet into the Aegean 
Sea, and eventually to the Eastern Mediterranean lines of 
communications. The third line passed through the Caucasus or East 
of the Caspian Sea, on the border between Turkey and Iran, aiming 




























































































Not only LOC in the Mediterranean would have been deeply affected by 
this eventuality, but also the possession of Middle East petroleum, 
of African raw materials and the possibility to use Suez route.
The difference between British and American positions in the Middle 
East theatre cannot be clearly understood without pointing at the 
distinction between these three realms of defence.
The main preoccupation of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff was to 
stick on the periphery of the area (first and, eventually, second 
hypothesis), as a bridge linking that theatre and the one in 
central Europe.
On the other hand, the British always priviledged the potential 
threat to the Levant (the second and third hypothesis) in which so 
many political and materials interests were at stake. This explains 
why Great Britain was always against Italian entrance in the 
Atlantic Pact and mainly interested in holding the southern part of 
the Italian peninsula in case war broke out (27) or why the British 
opposed Turkey's entering NATO and only consented to it in 
exchange of the Turkish promise that it would be a stronghold for 
the setting up of a Middle East Defense Organisation (created in 
November 1951 and doomed to fail soon after) (28).
According to the American view, the southern flank was conceived 
as a support area for military actions to be held in Europe. Turkey 
was considered a pivotal country whose forces had to be maily 
devoted to the defense of the Balkan front. British, on the 





























































































A main dispute between British and Americans arose in NATO because 
of this main divergence. The United States thought about a 
Mediterranean Command subordinated to SACEUR (Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe), while the British wanted it to be set 
independently. The quarrel ended up with a temporary solution in 
favour of the American view, reversed after the return of Churchill 
to power at the end of 1951 with a more pro-British and more 
ambiguous resolution -there would be two chiefs of staff and a 
functional rather than geographical division of resonsabilities 
inside the theatre. The American representative, Robert Carney 
(Commander, Allied Focres, Southern Europe) , would have control 
over the American VI Fleet with the mission to support armies and 
air forces struggling in Europe; the British one, Lord Mountbatten 
(Commander, Allied Forces, Mediterranean) would have been charged to 
control the line of communications through the sea and cover 
military operations in the Middle East theater without the 
necessity, for the south eastern section, of having to refer to the 
hierarchical authority of SACEUR (29) .
American fears over what has here been defined as the third threat 
seemed to be lessened by internal as well as external events 
happening in the Balkan front during the half of the fifties. On 
one hand Greece and Italy seemed to be definitely conquered to the 
cause of anti-communism, on the other hand Greece and Turkey were 
formally admitted in NATO (1952) ; military links were established 




























































































the provisional solution of the Trieste dispute at the end of 1954 
opened the path for military collaboration between Jugoslavia and 
Italy while Greece, Turkey and Jugoslavia gathered in a defensive 
agreement in summer 1954 -the Bled Pact. But this last one was bound 
to fail for many reasons, among which the more relevant were 1. 
the prevalence of conflicting interests over common ones in the 
case of Greece and Turkey (Cyprus was the hot spot during that 
period) which could not be mediated -as happened in the NATO case- 
by the weak Jugoslavia 2.the growing importance of the reconcilia­
tion between Belgrad and the Soviet Union.
Moreover any possibile agreement was seriously hampered by the 
conceptual difficulty of defining the most suitable way to defend 
the Middle East from the third threat. The British themselves were 
never clear on what could or should be done and often tended to
confuse the two perspective. Principally, there was difficulty in
2. . A .choosing between the so called outer ring and inner ring strategy - 
the first stressing on the importance of Palestine,Jordan and Egypt 
as being the defensive bastion with the last acceptable front 
passing through Israel on the Ramallah-Tel Aviv line and the second 
running from the Mediterranean Turkish coast opposite Cyprus along 
the Taurus mountains and the rim of the Turkish plateau to lake Van, 
then southwards along the arc of the Zagros Mountains down to Bandar 
Abbas on the Persian Gulf. Still in January 1954 the British Chiefs 
of Staff were adamant in stating that resources were not sufficient 
for this last defence line, thus leaving the first as the only 




























































































required that Soviet threat be met at the earliest possible time on 
the frontiers between Iraq and Iran (31). Bilateral military 
conversations with the Americans were held on the assumption that 
this last strategy should be followed by both the US and the UK 
(32)-
A dilemma invested the problem: the Inner Ring strategy, though 
military feasible (i.e. tenable with the military forces at hand) 
was politically impossibile because it split Israel in two and 
because it would have entailed Arab forces (as the Jordan Arab 
Legion of General Glubb Pasha) to fight along with the British for 
the sake of Israel. The Outer Ring strategy, on the opposite, was 
militarly implausible -for lack of material and human resources, 
problems of supplying and pre-stocking- even if it could have been 
politically feasible, in the sense that alliances could have been 
stipulated among countries participating in the defence of the 
area.
The improvement of the nuclear panoplia of armaments influenced the 
field of Middle Eastern strategy in a rather ambiguous way. The 
primary importance of the Suez area as the most palatable base 
outside Europe for a counter offensive against the Soviet Union was 
tackled in 1952 by the Soviet experimentation of a termonuclear 
device. Big bases as the Cairo one, where 80.000 troops were 
supposed to be retained as far as in 1954, seemed to have become 
obsolete (because they offered perfect targets for huge megaton 




























































































other hand, as we soon shall see, following the results of the 
Global Review of Military Strategy, the value of retaliation ( 
and,thus, of place from which to start it) seemed to be enhanced by 
the increase in bomb efficacity showed in early American tests of 
fusion devices and by the first test of a British atom bomb (both 
in 1952).
As we have already seen, from a military point of view, the 
Americans were eager to hear what could be a British contribution 
to the defense of the Middle East base and they would eventually be 
eager to send strategic bombers there, but could not possibilÿ 
devote a part of their military budget for the defense of the area 
f34). A reassessment of the first approved short term military plan, 
the HALFMOON, convinced the JCS in October 1948 to discard the 
hypothesis of using as second alternative (after Great Britain) the 
Khartum-Cairo-Suez area -previously considered} as a minimum 
requirement - as a base for SAC. Omar Bradley, head of the JCS, 
pointed out at the time how the financial difficulties experienced 
by the military would have made talks about the pros and cons of 
maintaining the Mediterranean preposterous (35). In the same period, 
the importance of having a strategic base in thè United Kingdom was 
stressed. Following a previous tentative agreement and the 
deployment of two American bomber groups in connection with the 
Berlin crisis, a high level British-American meeting was called 
in the UK; the subject was the formalization of American military 




























































































facilities and bringing the existing airfield up to B-29 operating 
standards (36) .
As it was made clear by George McGhee in Febrary 1950 "the Near 
East may be critical to our national interests in time of war, but 
it is vital to us in time of peace" (37) . This ment that American 
consideration went mostly to the importance of maintaining the 
Middle East out of Soviet influence in time of peace instead of 
defending it in time of peace.
American representatives remained "adamant" in their view that the 
Middle East theatre had to be under British responsability and still 
in 1952 they were against any "specific egagement" in the area (38). 
The "difference in emphasis" shown by the two countries was made 
plain during a conversation at the top levels between Admiral 
Fletcher (American Chief of Naval Operations) and Field Marshal Slim 
(British Chief of Imperial General Staff) held in May 1952. To the 
first's assumption that "if the Allies lost the Mediterranenan 'we 
would not have been hurt too much'", the second answered that 
"control of the Mediterranean was more important to the British than 
the naval support of SACEUR" (39) .
Growing concerns over the central front, on the opposite, undermined 
the Middle East cause in Great Britain. The new consideration of 
Europe as being an integral part of the 'first pillar" (the defense 
of Great Britain itself) was coupled with the sending of additional 
British troops (one infantry division and 1/3) to reinforce the 
British Overseas Army on the Rhine in March 1951 and the growing 




























































































This was followed by the new formulation of the Review of Defence 
Policy and Global Strategy endorsed by the new Conservative Cabinet 
in September 1952. With the general aim of reducing economic costs 
of defence, COS placed primary reliance on the deterrent value of 
nuclear forces. As far as the Middle East was concerned, this meant 
that British garrisons "should be reduced to a level adequate only 
to meet Cold War requirements", relying heavily on the possibility 
of a quick reinforcement from the UK and elsewhere (40). Thus, 
"after a settlement had been reached with Egypt, the strategic 
reserve should be brought home and the UK forces in the Middle East 
reduced to about one division and 160 aircrafts". In number, it 
would mean cutting in two the existing number of 62.200 men British 
garrison in the Middle East: land forces should concentrate in 
Libya, Jordan, Cyprus and Malta -these last two territories being 
the only British colonies left in the Middle East- and air forces in 
Iraq, Jordan, Cyprus, Aden and Malta (41).The path was open for the 
redeployement of British military forces east of the Suez Canal 
around the two keystones of Jordan and Iraq and the consideration of 
local forces as being an essential part of an efective defence (42).
Attempts of coordinated measures for the Middle East
No fruitful cooperative measure was taken by western powers in the 




























































































May 1950 (Great Britain, France and the United States). The most 
important features of the resolution were the following:
1. Arabs and Israelis needed a certain level of armed forces for the 
purpose of maintaining their internal security and their legitimate 
self-defence and permiting them to play their role in the defence 
of the area as a whole -the hidden ratio was that these countries 
would have called for Soviet help if their requests were not 
fullfilled by the western powers (as actually happened in 1955 with 
Egypt).
2. Should the three governments find that any of these states were 
preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, they would, in 
accordance with their obligations as members of the United Nations, 
immediately take action, both within and outside the UN to prevent 
such violation.
This last provision was never put into force (even because in its 
most patent violation, France and Great Brtain were parties in the 
case) and the resolution turned out to be nothing more than a means 
1. to stabilize the frontier status originated from the first Arab- 
Israeli war (1948-49), thus sanctioning the disregard of the ONU 
partition plan of 1947; 2. to bypass the ONU resolution which had 
called for an embargo on arms sold towards Israel and the Arab 
countries.
While Great Britain was engaged in the last touches of the new 
agreement with Egypt -and the linked problems of redeployment- the 
United States took lead in the diplomatic effort over the Middle 




























































































new Secretary of State Foster Dulles to the Middle East -Egypt, 
Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Greece, Israel, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, 
Pakistan, India) were at the origin of this shift. The Americans had 
never been too enthousiastic about British proposals such as Middle 
East Command and Middle East Defence Organization developed in the 
first years of the fifties: these schemes, providing for the 
presence of external ex-colonial powers would have put the Americans 
in the embarassing position of supporters of what was defined by the 
Arabs as a new form of military colonialism. At the same time, the 
main aim of the US in the ME was preventing international communism 
to take any advantage of the unstable situation and not to struggle 
against anti-colonial nationalism. That is why, at the beggining, 
the revolution of the Egyptian Colonels in July 1952 was seen with 
simpathy and it was not until Foster Dulles and Nasser had personal 
contacts that the US set aside the idea of sponsoring Nasser's 
leadership over the Arab world as a stabilizing factor. Coming back 
from his mission, Dulles stated: "A Middle East organisation is a 
future rather than an immediate possibility. Many of the Arab League 
countries are so engrossed with their quarrels with Israel or with 
Great Britain or France that they pay little attention to the menace 
of Soviet communism. However, there is more concern where the Soviet 
Union is near". No collective security agreement with western 
participation was, thus, to be imposed from the outside. Dulles' 
remarks were reformulated in NSC 162/6 (October 1953): in order to 
assure the United States and its allies resources (oil) and the 




























































































bastion in Turkey, Pakistan and, if possible, Iran (revolved to pro­
western attitudes after the CIA sponsored coup d'etat in the summer 
of 1953) a defensive bastion. The idea was not new. As a matter of 
fact, many years before (1947), the idea of a mutual defence 
agreement between Persia, Iraq, Turkey and Afghanistan had been 
devised in the Foreign Office itself, with the support of the COS, 
to tackle the possibility of a coordinated Kurdish uprising in 
Turkey, Iraq and Iran (43), but the failure of the ephemeral 
independent republic of Azerbaigian in Iran had probably put an end 
to this idea. On the military side, since the Anglo-American 
defence Malta talks in the beginning of 1951 the value of India and 
Pakistan had been stressed by both Chiefs of Staff (u ). But 
American proposals for a Norther Tier bastion, unofficially 
communicated to the British, had always found hostility in the 
political sphere because of the possible negative influence over the 
Pakistan-Indian dispute on Kashmir and thus discarded (45).
The innovation of such a proposal was the theoretical link 
established between Europe and the Far East via the Middle East 
, through the parallely stipulated South East Asia Treaty 
Organization (September 1954); an enormously extended safety belt 
around the Soviet Union was thus created -its pivotal centers being 
Turkey and Pakistan (46).
In practical terms, the American proposals, launched without any 
previous official warning to the Foreign Office, linked an offer of 
military aid to Pakistan, advanced at the end of 1953 and 




























































































collaboration between Pakistan and Turkey, which might be 
eventually enlarged (as it was) to develop into a collective defence 
system for the whole Northern Tier. Foreign Office officials, when 
first informed about the nature and scope of the pact in January 
1954, defined it "offensive" and suggested to discourage the 
Americans; Churchill did not agree with this suggestion, although he 
defined the proposal badly timed -just before the Berlin Four Power 
meeting (47) .
After being temporarly released from the Egyptian problem with the 
signing of the agreement on the evacuation of the Canal base in 
October 1954, the British were, then, faced with the growing reality 
of an American sponsored Norther Tier bastion. At the same time, 
after the Anglo-Egyptian agreement new diplomatic forces were freed 
to take lead again in the diplomatic effort toward the resolution of 
the more dividing Middle East issue: the Arab-Israeli dispute.
After coming back from an extensive tour in the Middle East (Autumn 
1954), the newly appointed British Under-Secretary for Middle 
Eastern Affairs Evelyn Shuckburgh pointed to its resolution as an 
essential step to solve two main problems: the restoration of 
stable relationships between Egypt and the Western powers and the 
prevention of the exploitation of the issue by the Soviets. Dulles 
and Eden agreed in December 1954 over the formulation of a peace 
plan to solve the Palestinian problem. Analogies with the question 
of Trieste were hastly drawn and the Italo-Jugoslavian agreement of 





























































































The anglo-american version of the plan was labelled ALPHA (49) and 
provided for a security garantee to Israel in exchange for 
territorial concession to Palestinians and new rules for refugees. 
The history of the diplomatic action and meetings of western 
representatives with Egyptian and Israel counterparts is far from 
clear -although the valid contributions of Shamir and Lucas, not to 
cite the biographical accounts, are clarifying. In spite of 
extensive efforts, by 30th August 1955, the plan seemed nothing more 
than "a beautiful dream" (50).
At this point, the Northern Tier bastion emerged as the only 
workable hypothesis for dealing with the question of Middle Eastern 
security. The Pact was clearly a means to bypass the two major 
difficulties which had been stressed by Dulles himself: Arab- 
Israeli dispute on one hand and Nasser's stubborness in refusing 
Western patronage on the Suez base and on the operative administra­
tion of the Canal coupled with a symmetric British strong refusal to 
release its authority (if not on the Base, on the Canal!).
After the accession of Iraq and the following official birth of the 
Bagdad Pact (February 1955) the British were confronted with the 
problem of American competitivness over the military support to Iraq 
-one of the pivotal countries for the redeployment of British forces 
and whose leader, Nuri Said, was seen as the only suitable candidate 
to an anti-Nasser leadership. They decided to enter the pact (March 
1955) (51) and tried to transform it from a military containment tool 
agaist the Soviet Union to a political tool against Egypt. British 




























































































creating a new political force, under Nuri Said's leadership, which 
could oppose the growing appeal of Nasser in the Arab world. That's 
why, while joining the Pact, the United Kingdom reinforced their 
ties with Levant countries, especially with the Hashemite governors 
of Jordan and Iraq -historically linked to Great Britain through 
bilateral military pacts- in a anti-nasserian perspective. British 
attempts came to an abrupt end in December 1955 when pressure to 
make Jordan associate with the Pact ended in mass riots. Jordan 
not only did not join, but the British had to dismantle the last 
stronghold of British military presence in the area, the famous 
Jordan Arab legion; its commander, the last living remeniscence 
of Lawrence of Arabia, General Glubb, better known with the 
onorific title of Glubb Pasha, was dismissed by King Hussein in 
March 1956 (52) .
After a long series of failures, the British approach to the Middle 
East security question was reduced step by step to a tentative 
peacemeal. This tactic was devised -as it has been argued by 
important scholars as Baylis and Bartlett (53)~ to allow any 
possibile option open while waiting for greater resources to become 
available. This incrementalism ended up to be counter-productive and 
contributed to undermine British position in the sense that, 
without a coherent vision of how to tackle the Middle East security 





























































































The inconclusivness of this kind of approach was best proved by the 
Suez crisis which could neither be prevented by the United States 
nor won by France and Great Britain.
The Suez affair clearly showed how dangerous the use of military 
means was to keep old political privileges; on the other hand it 
opened the path for a more resolute American intervention. British 
hegemony was perishing not only because of the difficulties of 
reshaping its Middle East policy but because it had been shaken by 
the search for a common ground with the United States -which had 
been at last ideally defined as being the military realm (Bagdad 
Pact)- and by the ineffectiveness of this tool with respect to the 
big security issues of the area.
This was a perfect time, for the U.S., to come into the picture: not 
having been associated too strongly with the British, having kept 
the public image of anti-colonial power, they could now begin to 
set their own path for the security of the Middle East without 
necessarily having to consult with any partner and to cooperate in 
devising new policies -as they had before.
The so called 'Eisenhower doctrine' (January 1957), with its stress 
on economic technical assistance to the Middle East, seemed to be 
devised in the mainstream of the concept stemming out from the point 
IV Truman declaration about underdeveloped countries. At the same 
time, it focused on military intervention against a communist menace 
to any state vitally important for American national security and 
this turned out to be its most outstanding feature. The first 




























































































support the Hashemit king Hussein against a coup d'Etat by alledged 
pro-Nasser officials; the other in 1958 in Lebanon in support of 
President Chamoun . On this occasion, Eisenhower was ironically 
rebuked by MacMillan of "doing a Suez" on the British. He was not 
too far from reality: the difference was that the United States 
were both military and politically more skillful and powerful. 
British retreat from the Eastern Mediterranean- Middle East could 
have repres ented an opportunity to reshape the whole question and 
focus on the solution of the real divisive issues. American pattern 
of military intervention -so similar to the previously critized in 
their European partners- put an end to this hope.
* The author wishes to thank Professor Alastair Parker and Dr.Scott 
Lucas for incisive comments on the paper and the Consiglio 
Nazionale delle Ricerche for the financial contribution related to 
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